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1. Introduction
In recent years, many professions in Japan have been facing the problem of end of lifetime 
employment. Pay systems based on age are also being changed to reward professional 
ability. With so many researchers involved, it would be impossible to list specific examples 
of wage determinants. The most common and important factors given are gender, 
academic history, and work history. Among these, investment in education contributes 
to the development of professional capabilities among individuals, and can consequently 
lead to higher lifetime wages. This scenario, proposed by Becker （1964）, was a big step in 
the development of human capital theory. Until then, wage differences were considered a 
systematic problem related to labor or resulting from imperfections in the labor market. 
However, following this approach, we were able to logically explain that dissimilar 
educational investments among people create different levels of work ability, which in 
turn lead to wage differences. Founded on this human capital theory, labor economics 
experienced a paradigm shift. Mincer （1974）, in particular, came up with a practical 
model based on this theoretical framework. Using Mincer’s （1974） practical wage model 
（Mincerian wage regression function）, it became possible to calculate the rate of return 
on investment in education. This scenario-based earning function was rated highly as a 
practical model of human capital theory and, because of its wide applicability, has been 
employed in a broad range of economic disciplines, including development economics and 
educational economics. The Mincerian wage regression function is thus known as the 
cornerstone of earnings functions.
1. Introduction
2. A Dynamic Model of Social Capital and Wage
3. Social Capital and Personnel Rating in Japan
4. Measuring Social Capital
5. Estimation of Wage Function with Social Capital
6. Concluding Remarks
－  　　－13
Previous studies have established that gender, academic history, work history, and 
other such social attributes do not constitute the exclusive determinant factors of earnings. 
In other words, they suggested that social attributes other than the above also have a 
role in determining earnings. In our paper, we focused on communication within the 
organization. Regardless of the amount of individual human capital accumulated within 
an organization and regardless of whether workers’ individual productivity is high, 
organizational productivity will not improve without smooth dissemination of information 
（communication） within the organization. In addition, you cannot expect a high level of 
efficiency without trust and cooperation among the many production processes （Knack 
and Keefer 1997 ; La Porta et al. 1997 ; Zak and Knack 2001 ; Bowles and Gintis 2002 ; Sobel 
2002）. The importance of smooth communication lies in the proverbial fact that “two heads 
are better than one.” For example, typically, two people will be able to come up with 
relatively better ideas based on the synergistic effects of their respective abilities. However, 
this can occur only where communication is effective. Without proper communication, 
there is a real possibility of a decline in organizational productivity irrespective of how 
productive each worker is.
Nakaba （1995） regards the ability to effectively communicate （communication ability） 
or cooperate with other workers as a type of human capital. On the other hand, Putnam 
（2000） does not consider communication ability to get things done effectively within 
a group as human capital. Rather, he considers communication ability ─ which he has 
researched deeply ─ on an independent basis. According to Putnam （2000）, the ability to 
smoothly communicate your desires is a form of social capital and, following physical 
capital and human capital, can be considered as the third factor contributing to production. 
In his book, Putnam （2000） stated that social capital is made up of three factors: trust, 
norms of reciprocity, and networks. He also said, “Physical capital refers to physical objects, 
human capital to the characteristics of individuals, and social capital to the connections 
between people （social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trust that stem from 
them）.” In addition, he suggested that if the accumulated pool of social capital is increased 
as an economic attribute, it leads to the promotion of cooperation between people within 
the organization, thus consequently improving productivity. With regard to the economic 
implications of social capital external to the organization, he paints a scenario in which 
communication proceeds smoothly between players in the market and, because this 
brings down the cost of business, cooperation between players can occur more readily. 
Furthermore, because communication flows more smoothly, the amount of information 
disseminated and the learning opportunities for individuals, firms, and organizations are 
greater, and different types of information can be combined in new ways. For example, 
formal and informal horizontal networks between venture businesses have promoted 
technological innovation in Silicon Valley, US.
If we consider physical capital and human capital as the engines of production 
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activities, social capital could be regarded as the lubricant required for the smooth operation 
of the engine. Similar to personal computers （physical capital） and education （human 
capital）, social capital influences the productivity of a firm. For example, in comparison to 
workers with a high sense of distrust, those who tend to trust their colleagues help improve 
productivity. If social capital is essential for efficient production activities, then firms 
should highly evaluate workers with a large accumulation of social capital. Moreover, that 
evaluation should be fed back to the workers in the form of increased wages. If workers are 
rational, they would work to enrich their social capital and, thus, increase their earnings. In 
order to explore the relationship between social capital and wage, we begin by introducing 
a simple dynamic model of social capital in the economy.
2. A Dynamic Model of Social Capital and Wage
Consider an economy populated by identical representative agents who invest in social 
capital. While recent studies consider social capital as the characteristic of an economy, 
we treat it as an individual characteristic, following Glaeser et al. （2002）. While our social 
capital model is similar to that of Glaeser et al. （2002）, we set up a continuous time model 
unlike their discrete time model, following Matsunaga ( 2020 ).
Suppose a representative agent possesses private social capital at time t, 𝑆𝑆�𝑡𝑡�, , and 
derives utility from both private social capital and an average level of social capital in the 
economy,  𝑆𝑆�  , over an infinite planning horizon. 𝑅𝑅�𝑆𝑆��  denotes a differentiable function with 
𝑆𝑆� as its argument. The flow payoff, 𝑅𝑅�𝑆𝑆��𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡)�, reflects both market returns and non-
market returns. Here, 0 < γ < 1 measures the impact of private social capital on the welfare, 
Z, of the representative agent. Market returns include higher wages, better promotion 
opportunity, and higher probability of finding a good job （Mouw 2003）. Non-market returns 
include improvement in the economy, health, or happiness. This paper argues that there 
are positive complementarities on time investment in social capital across individuals. 
Therefore, we assume that 𝑅𝑅��𝑆𝑆�� > 0 .
Let us assume that the time investment in social capital is denoted by:
 𝐶𝐶�𝐼𝐼�𝑡𝑡�, 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) �1 + ��
𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡)
𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡)��    （1）
where 𝜓𝜓�0� = 0,𝜓𝜓��𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼 � > 0  and 𝜓𝜓���𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼 � ≥  . Equation （1） implies the time investment 
with constant returns for both time investment and social capital and fundamental 
development of social capital takes time. For example, some people may take years to trust 
their neighbors or coworkers. Norms of reciprocity cannot be easily developed, either. This is 
particularly so if norms of reciprocity involve borrowing or lending money. Therefore, taking 
into account the time adjustment can be very important when social capital is accumulated 
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through promoting trust, networks, and norms of reciprocity. 








where b is a positive constant. The parameter b expresses the sensitivity of time adjustment 
and higher values of b implies more time adjustment.
Then, the representative agents’ intertemporal utility function can be denoted by








where 𝛽𝛽 is a positive time discount rate. The opportunity cost of time is denoted by the 
wage rate, 𝑤𝑤 if labor supply is inelastic. 
On the other hand, the social capital stock follows a dynamic process expressed by
 𝑆𝑆� = 𝐼𝐼 𝐼 𝜙𝜙𝑆𝑆  （4）
where 𝜙𝜙 > 0 . Let θ be the probability that a representative agent socializes with others. 
Then 𝜙𝜙 = θλ +�1 − θ� is the depreciation rate of social capital arising from loosing 
connections with others due to, for example, mobility from his or her workplace, community, 
club, and so on. When θ = 0 （i.e. He or she has withdrawn from society.）, his or her social 
capital depreciates at the maximum rate 1 . When θ = 1 （i.e. He or she is a very social 
person.）, his or her social capital depreciates at the rate 0 < λ < 1 . 
Then, for the initial value of social capital, 𝑆𝑆�0� = 𝑆𝑆̅ , we may set up the current value 
Hamiltonian,




𝑆𝑆�+ 𝑞𝑞�𝐼𝐼 𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆�  （5）
where q is the shadow value of social capital. Then, the necessary conditions derived from 
“the maximum principle” should involve









− 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 = −𝜙𝜙� + 𝜙𝜙𝑞𝑞 . （6b）
The optimal conditions for the centralized problem also involve the transversality condition,
 lim��� 𝑞𝑞�𝑡𝑡�𝑆𝑆�𝑡𝑡�𝑒𝑒
��� = 0 . （6c）
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Equations （6a） and （4） imply that
 𝑆𝑆� = �
�
� − 1
𝑏𝑏 � 𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. . （7）
Let 𝑆𝑆∗ and 𝑞𝑞∗ be the steady states of social capital and its shadow value, respectively.







− �𝜙𝜙 + 𝛽𝛽�𝑞𝑞 = 01 
 
1Note that if we assume 𝑅𝑅�𝑆𝑆�� = 𝑆𝑆�(���), then there is no transitional dynamics because 𝑆𝑆� = 𝑆𝑆 holds 
in equilibrium. Consequently, 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑆𝑆 immediately jump to their steady-state levels 
1 ）
. （8a）
Moreover, from equation （7）, the condition 𝑆𝑆� = 0 implies that
 𝑞𝑞 = �1 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙�𝑤𝑤 . （8b）
Equation （8b） implies that for 𝑏𝑏 > 0 , the shadow value of social capital in the steady state 
is greater than the wage rate by 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙 . Consequently, in steady state, 𝑆𝑆∗ must satisfy the 
condition




1 ） Note that if we assume 
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�1 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙�𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽𝜙𝜙𝑤𝑤 
Figure 1   The Phase Diagram with Saddle-path Stability
The Stable Arm
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Equation （8b） also implies that when social capital is entrenched in the economy and 
instantly available, or we have no time adjustment parameter �𝑏𝑏 = 0� , the steady-state value 
of 𝑞𝑞 is equivalent to the wage rate （i.e. 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑤𝑤 ）. However, these cases are not appropriate 
according to the social capital theory.
We can draw the phase diagram with saddle-path stability as shown in Figure 1 . 
Equation （6b） implies 𝑞𝑞� > 0  for 𝑆𝑆 > 𝑆𝑆∗ and 𝑞𝑞� < 0  for 𝑆𝑆 < 𝑆𝑆∗ . On the other hand, equation （7） 
implies 𝑆𝑆� > 0 for 𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞∗  and 𝑆𝑆� < 0 for 𝑞𝑞 < 𝑞𝑞∗ , as shown by the allows in Figure 1 .






𝑑𝑑 − �1 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙�𝑤𝑤 − 𝑤𝑤𝜙𝜙𝑤𝑤.   . （9）
Since the numerator is positive, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0 if 𝑞𝑞 > �1 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙�𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽𝜙𝜙𝑤𝑤 and 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 < 0 if 
𝑞𝑞 < �1 + 𝜙𝜙𝜙𝜙�𝑤𝑤 + 𝛽𝛽𝜙𝜙𝑤𝑤 . 
The system described in Figure 1 exhibits saddle-path stability. The stable arm is 
downward sloping, as shown by the solid line with arrows. 
A high value of social capital stimulates a great deal of time investment in social 
capital. Therefore, from equation （6a）, 𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼  is high when 𝑞𝑞  is high. An increase in social 
capital over time leads to a decrease in its price �𝑞𝑞�  and, in turn, to a reduction in 𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼  . 
Eventually, as 𝑞𝑞  approaches 𝑞𝑞∗ , 𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼  approaches 𝜙𝜙 as equations （6a） and （8b） show.
According to Putnam （2000）, the current level of social capital in the US is low （ex. 
S = S ）. Thus, this model suggests that the price of social capital should be higher than 
before in the US. Many Japanese researchers claim that the current level of social capital 
in Japan is also low. The Cabinet Office, Government of Japan （2003） reports that the 
number of active members in a neighborhood has been decreasing in the last 20 years. 
The social problems reported daily in the Japanese media, such as the growing number 
of deaths of unattached elderly persons and increasing juvenile delinquency, are partly 
caused by declining social capital in the society. Consequently, this model shows that when 
social capital in the economy is low, a worker with a high social capital would be paid a 
higher salary than another worker with a lower social capital.
3. Social Capital and Personnel Rating in Japan
We have so far focused on the simple dynamic model of social capital. According to 
equation （8c）, the next question that should be addressed is, “Does a wage system that 
can reflect accumulated social capital really exist?”
According to Sasajima （2004）, a typical personnel evaluation in Japan that controls 
earnings is categorized into abilities evaluation, emotional evaluation, and results evaluation 
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（see Figure 2）. Ability evaluation, which indicates one’s ability to do his or her job, is based 
on criteria within the organization. As shown in Figure 2 , ability evaluation is categorized 
into four sub-evaluation criteria: knowledge of duties, interpersonal skills, implementation 
skills, and leadership. Of these, interpersonal skills and leadership abilities that workers 
accumulate are related to social capital.
At any rate, human abilities are associated with many hidden qualities, making it difficult to 
evaluate them. According to Sasajima （2004）, the number of firms conducting competency 
evaluations is apparently increasing. These firms look at how workers actually perform 
their work and, by observation, evaluate whether or not they have work abilities, or what is 
their actual level of ability. For example, if negotiations with a particular business contact 




















Source Dejima (2004) 
 Figure 2   The Japanese Personal Evaluation Criteria
   Source: Sasajima （2004）
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Emotional evaluation is related to will and attitude. Specifically, this consists of four 
sub-criteria: cooperation （if they have a team）, positivity, discipline （whether they are 
disciplined in the workplace）, and company awareness （whether they act based on 
thinking about the bigger picture）. We can say that all of these evaluations are related to 
the social capital accumulated by workers.
Evaluation of results is another personnel evaluation criterion, but it is divided into 
three sub-criteria: work output, training, and achievement of objectives. However, none 
of these evaluations are related to social capital. Result evaluation is measured on sales, 
targets, and customer satisfaction; therefore, reflecting the evaluation results in wages is 
relatively easy. Moreover, it is easy for workers to understand when results are evaluated 
and reflected in wages. However, interpersonal skills （negotiation skills）, which can be 
regarded as social capital from abilities evaluation, can either be called human capital or 
social capital.
Basic salary mainly comprises age-based pay, work ability pay （effort pay）, and duty 
pay. According to the Nomura Research Institute （2008）, work ability pay is based on the 
ability to perform work duties. However, duty pay is based on the level of difficulty of the 
work you are responsible for doing. Work ability pay is the price attached to individual 
workers’ abilities, and duty pay is the price attached to the post you are assigned to. 
Therefore, academic history and on-the-job training have an influence on work ability pay, 
but do not have any impact on duty pay. However, if you do not enjoy the trust of other 
workers, network with other workers, or possess communication abilities, you will not 
be assigned to an important position. Therefore, we can conclude that social capital does 
influence both work ability pay and duty pay.
From the above discussion, wages can be related to social capital and personnel 
evaluation as follows. Social capital of workers is evaluated on the basis of interpersonal 
skills, leadership （ability evaluation sub-criteria）, cooperation, discipline, and company 
awareness （emotional evaluation sub-criteria）. Therefore, these are reflected in the salary 
through duty pay and work ability pay. The evaluation axis surrounded by the dotted line 
in Figure 2 indicates the evaluation related to workers’ accumulated social capital.
4. Measuring Social Capital
4.1. How Can We Quantify Trust?
With the progress of social capital studies, there is less dissent among researchers, but 
hardly any consensus on how to quantify social capital （Matsunaga 2015）.
The question on how to quantify social capital holds the key to the research objective 
of this paper. Numerous researchers have defined social capital in different ways. Some 
focus only on one element of social capital ─ a social network （e.g., Belliveau et al. 1996 ; 
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Seibert et al. 2001 ; Florin et al. 2003 ; Fischer and Pollock 2004）. Therefore, they measure 
social capital, for example, by the number of relations.
On the other hand, Dina （2008） measured social capital only by trust in order to 
empirically examine the relationship between social capital and human capital. Further, 
Dincer and Uslaner （2010） and Dearmon and Grier （2009） tried to measure social capital 
based on trust to show that trust has a positive effect on economic performance. However, 
Knack and Keefer （2000） tried to quantify trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks in 
order to examine if these three elements of social capital have positive effects on economic 
performance. Similarly, this paper tries to quantify Putnam’s three factors of social capital.
As part of an attempt, in the U.S, to quantify trust as one of the three factors of social 
capital, respondents of the General Social Survey （GSS） were asked, “Generally speaking, 
do you feel you can trust most people? Or, do you think it is wise to exercise caution?” 
The Cabinet Office, Government of Japan （2003）, which divides trust into “general trust” 
and “reciprocal trust/reciprocal support,” constructed a question similar to the GSS poser 
mentioned above to quantify general trust.
In this paper, we used data from the Japanese General Social Survey （JGSS）. The 
general information regarding the sampling of JGSS-2005 is as follows.
Sample area Nationwide
Sample population Men and women 20-81years of age living in Japan
Sample size 4,500
Sampling method
Two-stage stratified random sampling; stratified by
regional block and polulation size
No. of survey points: 307
No. of subjects at each survey point: 15
No. of respondents contacted 4,500
No. of valid responses 2,023
No. of nonresponses or invalid responses
2,477 (change of address: 190, address unknown: 79,
death: 11, long term absence: 53, sickness: 96, in
hospital: 56, other: 15)
Response rate 50.50%
The JGSS-2005 has the following interview questionnaire regarding general trust.
Q: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?
A: 1 . Yes    2 . Depends    3 . No
We can quantify trust based on the respondents’ answers to questions similar to those 
in GSS. In other words, workers who trust other workers and workers who think they can 
use the abilities of other workers will be able to conduct business dealings smoothly within 
and outside the company. Because such workers will help reduce business expenses, they 
will be paid higher work ability pay and duty pay than those who trust their coworkers 
less.
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4.2. How Can We Quantify Norms of Reciprocity?
With respect to the strength of norms （of civic cooperation）, Knack and Keefer 
（1997） tried to quantify respondents’ answers to a question whether each of the following 
behaviors “can always be justified, never be justified or something in between”: （a） 
claiming government benefits which you are not entitled to, （b） avoiding a fare on public 
transport, （c） cheating on taxes if you have the chance, （d） keeping money that you have 
found, （e） failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle.
Putnam （2000） described norms （of reciprocity） as follows: “Surely at some point someone 
else will definitely do something for me. So I will do something for you without expecting 
anything in return.” Therefore, Putnam’s （2000） view was slightly different from that of 
Knack and Keefer （1997）. In other words, the norm of reciprocity can be interpreted on the 
following lines: “He who gives to the poor lends to the lord.” Put another way, this means, 
“If you show mercy to people, at some point that will come back to you, so what you do for 
other people is not for them, but for yourself.”
Grootaert et al. （2004） used the following question to try to quantify norms of reciprocity: 
“Let us assume that your family suddenly needed a small amount of money for a period of 
one week. At this time, how many people outside of your family would lend you the money?” 
It seems that this question is most appropriate to measure norms of reciprocity designated 
by Putnam （2000）. However, there was no such question in our dataset, JGSS-2005 .
The Cabinet Office, Government of Japan （2003）, on the other hand, tried to quantify the 
norm of reciprocity through involvement in societal activities such as participation in green 
belts, volunteer activities, NPO, local city activities, etc. In the JGSS-2005 interview survey 
questions, we find similar questions as in Cabinet Office, Government of Japan （2003）. We 
regard the answers to the following question as a proxy variable to measure the norm of 
reciprocity.
Q: Have you made the following donations in the past year? Choose all that apply.
A:
1 . I donated regularly.
2 . I donated to collection boxes on street corners or in convenience stores, etc.
3 . I donated in response to fund-raising by schools or local organizations.
4 . I donated in response to appeals from media/mass communications
（via bank transfer, Internet, telephone, etc.）.
5 . Others （Please specify）
6 . I have not made any donations.
People throughout Japan sent large donations for the victims of the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
and Great East Japan earthquakes, and a large number of volunteers went to the affected 
areas offering help. However, they did not expect anything in return from the victims. 
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Nevertheless, people who hear about the large donations to the victims who flocked to the 
affected areas would probably expect that, in the event of a similar disaster, the same amount 
of donations would flow in. In other words, philanthropic acts such as making donations can 
be regarded as a type of the norms of reciprocity defined by Putnam （2000）. Thus, if the 
choice is anything other than option 6 , the respondent is considered to have the norm of 
reciprocity and will be coded NORM = 1 . If, on the other hand, the respondent chooses option 
6 , the individual is regarded not to have the norm of reciprocity and will be coded NORM = 0 .
4.3. How Can We Quantify Networks?
Generally, “relationships in the area” and “interaction with society” are used for quantification 
regarding network accumulation levels. The JGSS-2005 Survey Interview Sheet has a 
similar question.
Q: Are you a member of the following organizations?
A. Political associations 0 . No    1 . Yes
B. Trade associations 0 . No    1 . Yes
C. Social service groups 0 . No    1 . Yes
D. Citizens’ movement / Consumers’ cooperative groups 0 . No    1 . Yes
E. Religious groups 0 . No    1 . Yes
F. Sports groups and clubs 0 . No    1 . Yes
If the respondents belong to several of the above groups, clubs, or organizations, then we 
assume that they have cultivated a large network. Through involvement with various people 
you meet in various networks, you can improve your sociability, negotiation power, and 
ability to read people. For example, when you meet a businessman you want to convince, 
you would be able to smoothly do so, and might be able to create new business opportunities 
through your networking activities. It is also possible that the number of business contacts 
could increase. Many organizations focus on building internal workers’ networks within 
the company, plan multiple events as a way to share information, and proactively work on 
smooth flows of information within the company. For example, the Mori Building （website） 
conducted an awareness survey related to office life. In the survey, the investigators 
concluded that sporting events, staff vacations, drinking nights, activity circles, volunteer 
activities, and other types of communication outside of the workplace, in other words, 
informal communication, are particularly important for office workers in their 20 s.
From the above discussion, if you belong to only one of the organizations mentioned 
above, you get a network accumulation rating of 1 ; if you belong to all of the organizations, 
your network accumulation rating is 6 . Although the largest network accumulation 
value is theoretically 6 , the highest value that the model uses is 5 , according to the base 
statistical values shown in Table 2 .
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5. Estimation of Wage Function with Social Capital
In addition to the existing human capital viewpoint, we aim to estimate an earnings 
formula for a typical individual through the quantification of social capital, discussed in the 
second and third sections. The question on earnings in the JGSS-2005 Survey Interview 
Sheet is designed as follows.
Q: What was the annual income from your main job during the last one year? Please 
state the amount before taxes and other deductions.
1 （a） None 11 （k） 6 . 5 million yen‒7. 5 million yen
2 （b） Less than 700 , 000 yen 12 （l） 7. 5 million yen‒8 . 5 million yen
3 （c） 700 , 000 yen‒1 million yen 13 （m） 8 . 5 million yen‒10 million yen
4 （d） 1 million yen‒1 . 3 million yen 14 （n） 10 million yen‒12 million yen
5 （e） 1 . 3 million yen‒1 . 5 million yen 15 （o）  12 million yen‒14 million yen
6 （f） 1 . 5 million yen‒2 . 5 million yen 16 （p） 14 million yen‒16 million yen
7 （g） 2 . 5 million yen‒3 . 5 million yen 17 （q） 16 million yen‒18 . 5 million yen
8 （h） 3 . 5 million yen‒4 . 5 million yen  18 （r） 18 . 5 million yen‒23 million yen
9 （i） 4 . 5 million yen‒5 . 5 million yen 19 （s） 23 million yen or over
10 （j） 5 . 5 million yen‒ 6 . 5 million yen
Based on the simple dynamic social capital model and the JGSS-2005 question format 
for earnings and social capital, the Mincerian wage regression function incorporated with 
social capital could be expressed as follows. 






+ 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,  𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,3⋯𝑛𝑛 , （10）
     𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤� = 𝑗𝑗  if 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗1 ≤ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗, 𝐽𝐽 = 1,⋯ , 𝐽𝐽,   𝐴𝐴0 = 𝑗∞,   𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = +∞ 
 
where As are logarithms and 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤∗  is a latent variable of wage. Explanatory variables, X; 
SC; DEP are socio-demographic and human capital variables, social capital variables, and a 
depreciation variable of social capital arising from loosing communication with others due 
to his or her mobility from current job or business, respectively. A constant term is given 
by α and coefficients of explanatory variables are given by β ; γ ; δ. In particular, γ and 
δ are expected to be 𝛾𝛾 > 0  and −1 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 < 0 , respectively in accordance with the dynamic 
model of social capital and wage shown in Chapter 2 . 
In addition, for the categorical data model estimation, we group answers 1 （None） 
and 2 （Less than 700 , 000 yen） into a single category. Therefore, the explained-variable 
categories in this study, numbering 18 , are one lesser than those of the original JGSS-
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2005 . The explained variables are listed in Table 1 . The statistics in Table 2 form the basis 
of the results of the categorical data model, shown in Table 3 . The left-hand column of 
Table 3 shows the results estimated from a sample of men and women. The middle and 
right-hand columns show the results for men and women, respectively. The most salient 
points of the results are organized and explained as follows.
First, the income for men is about 78% higher than the income for women as shown in 
the left-hand column of Table 3 . Such a large income difference between men and women 
is possibley because the sample population includes housewives who do not earn income. 
In addition, compared to those residing in large cities, the income is about 19% lower 
for those who reside in medium-sized cities and about 15% lower for those who reside in 
small cities. This can probably be explained by the fact that most large companies that 
pay higher salaries are located in large cities. Income is about 13% lower for those who 
work at medium-sized companies than those who work at large companies. Furthermore, 
those who belong to a labor union earn an about 10% higher income than those who do 
not. While most large companies have a formal labor union that includes most employees 
as members, medium-sized companies often do not have a formal labor union; even when 
they do, the union often lacks the ability to negotiate salaries with the management. 
Income is higher for workers who belong to a labor union when compared to those who do 
not, because belonging to a labor union implies working for a rather large company.
The analysis results indicate that as shown in previous studies, human capital is 
positively related to income. Salary increases by about 8% for every additional year of 
education. Also, salary increases by about 3% for each year of work experience, but this 
rate of increase diminishes over time. Likewise, salary increases by about 5% for each 
year of service, but this rate, too, diminishes over time.
As for the focal interest of this paper, the analysis results indicate that each of the 
three factors of social capital ─ networks, trust, and norms of reciprocity ─ is positively 
related to income. Specifically, as the network expands （i.e., when the worker joins one 
more organization on the list）, income increases by about 8%. In addition, as the individual 
gets to trust others unconditionally, income increases by about 10%, and those who make 
donations earn an about 9. 7% higher income than those who do not. 2 ）
On the other hand, men with wives had about 13% higher yearly salary than those 
without wives as shown in the middle column of Table 3 . We feel that the family support 
allowance could be a contributory factor for this difference. However, women with 
husbands earned roughly 15% less than those without husbands as shown in the right-hand 
2 ） It is also conceivable that individuals with higher income are more likely to make a donation than 
individuals with lower income. However, Matsunaga （2010） has found that volunteers with lower income 
are actually more likely to make a donation than those with higher income. Therefore, we cannot 
necessarily conclude that individuals with lower income are more likely to make a donation than those 
with higher income.
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Table 1   Dependent and independent variables
Dependent variable
(1) 0- less than 700,000 yen (10) 6.5 million yen - 7.5 million yen
(2) 700,000 yen - 1 million yen (11) 7.5 million yen - 8.5 million yen
(3) 1 million yen - 1.3 million yen (12) 8.5 million yen - 10 million yen
(4) 1.3 million yen - 1.5 million yen (13) 10 million yen - 12 million yen
(5) 1.5 million yen - 2.5 million yen (14) 12 million yen - 14 million yen
(6) 2.5 million yen - 3.5 million yen (15) 14 million yen - 16 million yen
(7) 3.5 million yen - 4.5 million yen (16) 16 million yen - 18.5 million yen
(8) 4.5 million yen - 5.5 million yen (17) 18.5 million yen - 23 million yen
(9) 5.5 million yen - 6.5 million yen (18) 23 million yen or over
Independent Variables
SEXX = 1 if the respondent is male






The level of the respondent's health condition
poor good
0 1 2 3 4
XXLSTS = Educational attainment
JOBEXP = Work experience= age- educational attainment -6
JOBEXP2 = Square of JOBEXP
XJOBYR = Length of service
XJOBYR2 = Square of XJOBYR2
No Depends Yes
TRUST = 0 1 2
NORM =
NET 1  = 1 if the respondent is a member of political associations; 0 otherwise
NET 2  = 1 if the respondent is a member of trade associations; 0 otherwise
NET 3 = 1 if the respondent is a member of volunteer groups; 0 otherwise
NET 4 =
NET 5  = 1 if the respondent is a member of religious groups; 0 otherwise
NET 6 = 1 if the respondent is a member of sports groups; 0 otherwise
NETWORK =
 Are you considering quitting your current job or business?
DEP =




Number of child(ren) in compulsory school education
1 if the respondent lives in a middle-sized city
1 if the respondent lives in a small city
1 if the respendent works for firm with less than 300 labors





[Trust] Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted?
[Norms of reciprocity]
 Have you made the following donations in the past year? Choose all that apply.
1. I donated regularly
2. I donated to collection boxes on street corners or in convenience stores, etc
3. I donated in response to fund-raising by schools or local organizations
4. I donated in response to appeals from media/mass communications
　(via bank transfer, Internet, telephone, etc.)
5. Others (Please specify)
6. I have not made any donations.
1 if the choice　is anything other than option 6; 0 otherwise
Depreciation
2. I am considering quitting now.
[Networks] 1 if the respondent is a member of a citizens' movement or
consumers' cooperative groups; 0 otherwise
∑NET i , i=1,2,3,4,5,6
0. I am not considering quitting at all.
1. I am considering quitting in the near future.
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column of Table 3 . Our theory that women with husbands may actually be combining 
work with housework and care of infants seems plausible. Probably, many of these women 
work part-time, where the work time is shorter and hours are irregular. Regarding the 
increase in annual salary with an additional year of education, men witnessed an about 4. 2% 
increase and women 5%, which is not substantially different between the two. The number 
of years of education differed by four years between high school and university graduates, 
and the annual salary was, therefore, about 16. 8% higher for male university graduates 
and about 20% higher for female university graduates.
However, our estimated results also show that, if women change their jobs at some 
point of time, they cannot expect the same annual salary increase as men, no matter how 
much work experience they have. Comparing the wage increase for each year of work 
experience, we note a difference of about 4 . 7 times [=（0 . 0322－0 . 0005×2）/（0 . 007－0 . 0002
×2）] between men and women. You could say that women and men are not on an equal 
footing when it comes to personnel evaluation, unlike age-based pay. However, there is 
no noticeable difference whether a woman works in a small and medium-sized or large 
firm. Traditionally, a man could expect more pay at a large firm compared to a small and 
medium-sized company. Moreover, being a union member seems to have no impact on the 
annual salary of women.
These results, when compared with those of other developed nations, may be related 
to the fact that the number of women being assigned to important posts is still relatively 
small. Considering the years of education and their influence, we observe that the 
labor environment for women in our country is improving. However, compared to other 
developed nations, there is still plenty of room for improvement.
Table 2   Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis
wage （not logarithm） 6.2486 3.4996 1 18 0.38 2.86
SEXX 0.5581 0.4969 0 1 -0.23 1.05
SPOUSE 0.7376 0.4402 0 1 -1.08 2.16
COMPEDU 0.3947 0.7870 0 4 1.96 5.96
ST5HLTH 2.5109 1.0268 0 4 -0.28 2.55
SCALE1 0.6444 0.4790 0 1 -0.60 1.36
SCALE2 0.1841 0.3878 0 1 1.63 3.65
XXLSTS 12.9068 2.3956 6 18 -0.09 2.71
JOBEXP 28.0690 15.1646 0 73 0.17 2.33
JOBEXP2 1017.5720 927.9587 0 5329 1.21 4.53
XJOBYR 14.6456 13.6145 0 60 1.03 3.35
XJOBYR2 399.6352 626.4402 0 3600 2.37 9.33
SMFIRM 0.6651 0.4722 0 1 -0.70 1.49
UNION 0.3176 0.4658 0 1 0.78 1.61
NETWORK 0.4695 0.7424 0 5 1.87 7.45
TRUST 1.1323 0.5837 0 2 -0.03 2.80
NORM 0.6778 0.4676 0 1 -0.76 1.58
DEP 0.5972 0.6119 0 2 0.50 2.36
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Next, among the three social capital factors （trust, norms of reciprocity, and networks）, 
norms of reciprocity have no influence on annual salary. We are not sure why norms of 
reciprocity have no impact while estimating equation （1） for men and women separately. 
The difficulties associated with the quantification of norms of reciprocity or the limitations 
of data used might explain this. For trust, the annual salary rose by about 6% for men and 
6 . 2% for women, and therefore, there is no significant difference between men and women. 
For networks, the increase was about 5% for men and 4. 4% for women, and therefore, again 
there is no significant difference between men and women. In addition, as the dynamic 
model of social capital and wage shown in Chapter 2 implies the estimated  depreciation 
rate is −1 ≤ 𝛿𝛿 < 0 excluding the female sample case.
Regarding the influence of social capital measured by TRUST and NORM on annual 
salary, there was no significant difference between men and women. Interestingly, 
this was a contrasting feature between social and human capital. Social capital was an 
important factor for increasing annual salary for both men and women. Based on the level 
of education, men and women could expect their annual salary to increase in the almost 
same ratio. It seems that there is no gender issue with respect to social capital and its 
relationship with earnings.
Based on estimated results from the combined sample of men and women, shown in 
the left-hand columns of Table 3 , Figures 3a‒3c illustrate how trust, network, and norms 
of reciprocity are related to earnings. We used average values of the data variables to 
calculate the fitted values of earnings. Figure 3a, relating to trust and network, shows how 
earnings change when you change the accumulated value. For example, if you compare 
workers who trust （TRUST = 2）, between NETWORK = 0 and NETWORK = 5 , you will 
see a significant difference of 1 . 42 million yen in annual salary. However, the possibility 
that workers with a high income will have a broad network and high accumulated network 
value is undeniable. Since we used cross-sectional data in this research, we are unable to 
clarify the cause and effect relationship between the two. On the other hand, when the 
network accumulation value is 5 , we see a 0 . 4 million yen difference between workers 
where TRUST = 2 and TRUST = 1 .
Likewise, if you compare workers who donate time or money （NORM = 1） between 
NETWORK = 0 and NETWORK = 5 , you will see a difference of 1 . 32 million yen in 
annual salary （see Figure 3b）. On the other hand, when the network accumulation value 
is 5 , we see a 0 . 31 million yen difference between workers where NORM = 1 and NORM 
= 0 . Moreover, comparing workers who give time or money between TRUST = 0 and 
TRUST = 2 , you will see a difference of 0 . 44 million yen in annual salary. However, when 
TRUST = 2 , we see a 0 . 27 million yen difference between workers where NORM = 1 and 
NORM = 0 （see Figure 3 c）.
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In this paper, we estimated the Mincerian wage regression function after formulating 
a utility maximization problem that takes into account social capital. There should 
be many companies where social capital accumulation of workers is reflected in their 
personnel evaluation because social capital brings useful effects to companies through 
reducing transactional costs and improving the negotiation skills of workers. However, 
most Mincerian wage regression function estimations conducted in previous studies 
focused on factors such as race, gender, and human capital. Therefore, this paper created 
a theoretical model by focusing on the relationship between social capital and wage. The 
theoretical model of social capital in this paper showed that the price of social capital is 
high, and is reflected in wages in an economy with scarce social capital. The econometric 
model estimation, which validates the results of this theoretical model, indicated that the 
wage increases, regardless of gender, once the worker’s social capital is developed. This 
is probably because workers with a larger social capital are more likely to be promoted 
and receive an increased pay because of their better communication skills and higher 
productivity.
On the other hand, the analysis conducted in this paper indicated that human capital 
measured by work experiance has a greater wage effect for men than women. The fact 
that men earn higher wages than women in Japan has been recognized as a gender issue. 
This paper suggests that a gender issue does exist. We need to carefully monitor the effect 
of Positive Discrimination, a proactive initiative to promote and utilize the capabilities of 
women, launched under the Equal Employment Opportunity Law amendments of 2007, 
enacted to eliminate the de facto gender disparity in the workplace. Meanwhile, this 
paper’s analysis indicates that social capital effect on wages is about the same between 
men and women. This is a major difference between social capital and human capital.
Now, we need to pay most attention to the method of quantifying social capital in 
interpreting the analysis results of this paper. Although many researchers have worked on 
the quantification of social capital, they have not reached a consensus. Therefore, a note on 
the quantification method is not necessarily specific to this paper. In addition, because no 
previous study has used an empirical method to explore the social capital effect on wages, 
I believe this paper is sufficiently meaningful as a pilot study.
Future research tasks include demonstrating whether social capital improves the 
productivity of companies. If social capital improves the productivity of companies by 
reducing transaction costs and improving negotiation skills of workers, as social capital 
theory suggests, we can directly observe the effect of social capital in the productivity 
of workers. In addition, social capital could be expected to have a greater effect on 
productivity when the industrial goods are more labor-intensive than capital-intensive. An 
estimation based on a stochastic frontier model would be useful to analyze this type of 
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relationship between social capital and the productivity of workers.
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